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Apple CommentaryApple CommentaryThe Inside Deets on iPhone 2.0.2 and Dropped Calls
The iPhone 2.0.2 update “fixed power control on the mobile,” the source told RoughlyDrafted. UMTS, the technology used to deliver AT&T’s 3G network, refers to phones and other client devices as “UE” for user equipment, and the base transceiver station towers as “Node B.”
Why the iPhone 3G dropped calls “If the UE power control algorithm is faulty then they will demand more power from the cell than is necessary and with multiple users this can cause the cell transmitter to run out of power. The net result is that some UEs will drop their call. I have seen the dropped call graphs that correspond to the iPhone launch and when the 2.0.2 firmware was released. The increase in dropped calls,” the source said, were the result of “dropped calls due to a lack of downlink power.”
Why the iPhone 3G suffered poor data throughput “This is one of the reasons why AT&T has been sending text messages to users to persuade them to upgrade to the 2.0.2 software. In a mixed environment where users are running 2.0, 2.0.1, and 2.0.2, the power control problems of 2.0 and 2.0.1 will affect the 2.0.2 users.” “It is not the network that is fault but the interaction of the bad power control algorithm in 2.0 and 2.0.1 software and the network that is at fault. The sooner everybody is running 2.0.2 software the better things will be. Having seen the graphs the 2.0.2 software has already started to make difference.” That explains why some users saw no immediate impact after installing iPhone 2.0.2, and why tests of individual iPhone 3G models showed no significant difference between the 2.0 and 2.0.2 software: the problem was only evident when a critical mass of phones all acted in concert to run a given cell tower out of power. This also explains why users in locations such as San Francisco and New York were seeing bigger problems than users in less densely populated areas where fewer iPhone 3Gs were in use.
Categories: Apple Commentary
Why Apple Plays God with the iPhone SDK
One obvious recent example of this is OpenClip, a student developer’s plan to add copy and paste features to the iPhone by allowing third party apps to copy pasteboard data from other applications’ private directories. This works under the current iPhone 2.0 software, but only because Apple hadn’t yet finalized all of the details of its application sandbox security enforcement. With the iPhone 2.1 SDK betas, which started shipping before OpenClip was released, the iPhone 2.1 software no longer allows apps to peek at each other’s files, the implementation of a policy Apple originally announced to developers in the “iPhone OS Programming Guide” with the original iPhone 2.0 SDK. There are many other examples of how hobbyist efforts to graft unofficial APIs into mainstream iPhone development could cause problems for Apple and for users.
Daring Fireball: Raining on the OpenClip Parade
Software Chaos INITs or Extensions frequently ran into conflict with each other and destabilized the system. They also served as a vector for viruses. Once an Extension grew popular among users, it became difficult for Apple to work around any problems it might cause or to deliver new features that might run into conflict with existing Extensions. In Mac OS X, Apple intentionally provided no mechanism for broadly patching the OS in the manner of System 7’s Extensions. Third party developers have still managed to find ways to hack into the OS however. Mac OS X’s Input Managers, a mechanism NeXT originally designed to serve a controller for adding language support for complex character sets across applications, were hacked into a general purpose way to patch into nearly every app on the system and inject code that could modify their behavior and user interface. It’s easy to see why Input Managers also serve as a security hole and a destabilizing factor that cause applications to crash and system updates to fail. MacJournals News : Input Managers are not ‘plug-ins’ Security Enforced by Authority. As Apple progressively tightens down the system to enhance users’ security, it has only asked developers not to use Input Managers inappropriately; it hasn’t yet banned them. it also asks developers not to install code into the Mac OS X kernel unless absolutely necessary, and provides security guidelines to follow when installing applications and in other cases where sloppy behaviors could expose users to potential threats. In other areas, Apple has gone beyond just making suggestions and is enforcing rules that following known best practices in security. From the start, Mac OS X was compartmentalized into Unix domains, including a System domain for Apple’s software, a machine domain for system wide Applications, and a User domain that segregated the settings and files of each user. User accounts and file permissions enforced the domain boundaries, to help prevent software from assuming more control that it should. In the iPhone OS, third party applications are further compartmentalized into sandboxes. There is no communal file system that all apps can share as there is on desktop computers. Instead, each app can only access its own files within its sandbox for security reasons. Apple also limits third party apps from lingering in the background after a user has dismissed them with the home button. This is both a power saving mechanism and part of the iPhone’s security policy. The system also requires that all apps be signed by a recognized authority, so that malware vendors can’t distribute untraceable software. Efforts to inject malicious software into distribution through the iTunes Apps Store on the sly can be remotely shut down by Apple using its “kill switch” of certificate-based security. Apple’s heightened security enforcement measures on the iPhone are also making their way onto the Mac OS X desktop, in order to allow corporations to centrally manage the software installed on their computers and to allow parents to control the access their children are allowed. Apple’s security efforts are being rolled out in incremental advancements. If the company allowed third party developers to fork its strategies and introduce frameworks that impeded or conflicted with its plans, it would dial the company back into the days of System 7, where Mac Extension conflicts caused crashes that Apple could do little about because it wasn’t exercising its authority to enforce security on its platform.
iPhone 2.0 SDK: How Signing Certificates Work The Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil. With its Android smartphone platform, Google appears to be offering users and developers the tantalizing fruit of determining for themselves what they want, including a security model where developers vouch for their own apps on a handshake and users are free to initiate their own trust relationships with developers without any certificate-based security administered by a central authority. However, that kind of freedom has served as fertile ground for the viruses, spyware, and adware crisis of the desktop Windows PC. The web itself is another example of a platform where anything goes and security is an afterthought, with the result being egregious adware and the mass distribution of malware that exploits the freedom of Windows PCs to seed new replicants and spam. Microsoft contributed to the seedy nature of the web early on with its ActiveX technology, which gave developers wide open freedom to do things within the browser, with disastrous results. The only way to secure the web is to limit what can be done within the browser and rely upon external authorities to certify encrypted transactions where necessary. Android developers, hardware makers and service providers will also have the freedom to pick and chose which APIs, hardware, and applications they want to support, ostensibly giving users the freedom of an infinite number of choices to select from, a policy that has introduced chaos among Windows Mobile phones, where choice is often an impediment rather than a feature. Symbian phones similarly have three different UI layers to chose from. Linux on the desktop has two main desktop environments, KDE and GNOME, with incompatible behaviors and implementations.
Will Google’s Android Play DOS to Apple’s iPhone? Don’t Trust Any Company Under 30. While some critics of Apple’s security policies worry the company exercises too much control what software providers can offer on the iPhone, it’s also true that the company’s mobile platform has delivered a level of success and security for mobile software distribution that other platforms can’t match, with tangible benefits for both developers and users. The iPhone’s App Store prevents widespread piracy of developers’ work, allowing them to sell their software in volume for just a few dollars a title rather than the $15 to $50 that mobile software commonly sells for on other platforms. Users can also be confident that applications they download through iTunes aren’t infected with viruses, or spying on them via key loggers or other background tasks, and can’t even access their location without asking permission first. Android, Windows Mobile, and other mobile platforms can only hope that malicious developers don’t assault their users. Those vendors also lack a kill switch to do anything about it afterward. And despite all the freedom Android promises to provide in hardware variety (something Windows Mobile currently delivers), iPhone users have the actual freedom of knowing that titles they buy from the Apps Store will work on their phone. iPhone developers have the freedom to add accelerometer support into their apps because all iPhones have the hardware to use it. That’s not the case with Windows Mobile, and it won’t be true with Android either. While it’s true other platforms offer features the iPhone doesn’t, Apple’s platform starts off from a secure foundation that will be easy to build new features upon; it’s far harder to retrofit security into a platform that was designed to be full featured and impose few limits nor set any clear standards. Security requires a trustworthy authority. If Apple stopped playing God, it wouldn’t be doing its job. Did you like this article? Let me know. Comment here, in the Forum, or email me with your ideas. Like reading RoughlyDrafted? Share articles with your friends, link from your blog, and subscribe to my podcast (oh wait, I have to fix that first). It’s also cool to submit my articles to Digg, Reddit, or Slashdot where more people will see them. Consider making a small donation supporting this site. Thanks!
Categories: Apple Commentary
Repeat tests show iPhone 3G doesn’t suffer from faulty hardware
Continues: Repeat tests show iPhone 3G doesn’t suffer from faulty hardware
Categories: Apple Commentary
Road to Mac OS X 10.6 Snow Leopard: 64-BitsNext year’s 10.6 reference release of Mac OS X promises to deliver technology updates throughout the system without focusing on the customer-facing marketing features that typically sell a new operating system. Here’s a look at what those behind-the-scenes enhancements will mean to you, starting with new 64-bit support. The move toward 64-bit computing is often generalized behind the assumption that “more bits must be better,” but that’s not always true. In some cases, expanding support for more bits of memory addressing only results in requiring more RAM and computing overhead to do the same thing. However, Apple’s progressive expansion of 64-bit support in Snow Leopard will bring performance enhancements across the board for users of new 64-bit Intel Macs. Here’s a look at why, along with how it is that every version of Mac OS X since Tiger has advertised “64-bit support” as a key feature. Continues: Road to Mac OS X 10.6 Snow Leopard: 64-Bits
Categories: Apple Commentary
Report: Mac adoption expanding in the enterpriseDespite the lack of any clear and obvious enterprise strategy at Apple, analyst Benjamin Gray of Forrester Research reported an incremental gain in enterprise Mac use among the 2,500 organizations the company tracks, representing 50,000 end users.
Categories: Apple Commentary
Will Google’s Android Play DOS to Apple’s iPhone?
This decision isn’t going to be made by a class of intellectual elite, or by government mandate. it’s going to be made by the market itself. Here are the factors that will influence the outcome, either marginalizing Apple’s iPhone into a niche as the company has twice experienced previously at the hands of DOS in 1981 and Windows in 1991, or positioning it as the dominant leader as Apple has achieved for itself with the iPod since 2001. Will the iPhone Meet its Match from a Modern Day DOS? Rubin had earlier worked at WebTV along with Chris White and Andy McFadden, both of whom had also joined Android. Richard Miner of Orange and Nick Sears of Tmobile also brought their mobile provider experience to Android. At the time of the acquisition, Google didn’t announce any plans for Android and instead only told BusinessWeek, “We acquired Android because of the talented engineers and great technology. We’re thrilled to have them here.” It appeared that Google was only going to be expanding its search services for mobile phone users, along the lines of the Google SMS answer system it had recently released. Google Buys Android for Its Mobile Arsenal - BusinessWeek In October 2007, I printed the Great Google GPhone Myth, taking apart the idea that Google would be directly competing against the iPhone, and describing that Google was really working on a free alternative to Windows Mobile as a conduit for getting its search and related services on a broader variety of mobiles. Google’s services were already on the iPhone. In November, Google played its hand: it had organized a consortium of companies called the Open Handset Alliance to develop open standards for mobiles. The first product from the group would be Android, a mobile operating system built on the Linux kernel. Google wasn’t getting into the phone handset business at all; it was only making sure that its mobile search products would not risk being marginalized by the threat of Windows Mobile on phones in the same way Microsoft had been working to leverage its PC monopoly to push Google search off the Windows desktop. The Great Google gPhone Myth Two weeks later, Google released an early version of the Android software. On top of a Linux kernel, Android uses a specialized version of a Java Virtual Machine that takes Java language code and turns it into what Google calls “Dalvik bytecode” rather than Java bytecode as a standard JVM would. This allows Google to leverage existing and familiar Java language tools without paying Sun for a Java license. Like Mac OS X and its fraternal iPhone OS, Android includes a variety of open source libraries, including SQLite and WebKit. On top of that, Google developed a series of frameworks that handle the tasks Cocoa Touch does on the iPhone. Android also bundles a set of applications. While Apple adapted its existing Mac OS X to work in a mobile environment to create the iPhone OS, Android is more like a customized Java environment running on a specialized mobile Linux variant: elements of maturity in an otherwise experimental new platform. What is Android? -Google Google’s OHA also isn’t the first consortium to attempt to standardize a mobile Linux platform. The OSDL started the Mobile Linux Initiative to define requirements for hardware; the Consumer Electronics Linux Forum (CELF) then worked to define various phone profiles aimed at the Japanese market; the Linux Phone Standard (LiPS) Forum tried to do the same thing in Europe. In 2007, LiPS was folded into the new LiMo Foundation, along with the OSDL. All of these committees have had some overlap and some complementary features. Several of Google’s OHA partners are also LiMo members, including NTT DoCoMo, Wind River, and Motorola. So why didn’t Google just join LiMo? “LiMo, very candidly, wasn’t moving fast enough,” OHA board member John Bruggeman told CNET. Google hopes to herd the Linux cats into a progressive, structured platform that can battle against Symbian and Windows Mobile to succeed as the new DOS of smartphones. Will Google fracture or unify mobile Linux? The Presumption of the Necessity of DOS. The previous segment examining Windows Mobile pointed out how the PC industry as a whole assumed that Microsoft’s desktop Windows monopoly would easily take over dominance in the MP3 player market, pushing Apple into a niche position. This was expected because DOS had pushed Apple’s early computers into a reduced role starting in 1981, and Microsoft had repeated this again in 1991 when the DOS world migrated to Windows, effectively pruning Apple’s Macintosh into a Bonsai platform. The inability of one company to dominate any product category has been frequently repeated by PC industry pundits as a given, despite the fact that history is full of examples of this happening. Sony dominated personal music players for two decades under the Walkman brand even while equally large competitors tried to push it from this position; Nintendo has similarly owned handheld gaming despite ill-fated efforts to grab a piece of its pie by products running a generic platform such as Microsoft’s WinCE (Gizmondo), Linux (GP32), and Symbian (N-Gage). In fact, outside of the Windows/DOS PC, there are actually few examples of a generic platform taking over an industry. Nearly every other consumer-facing product uses proprietary platforms: car makers, stereo equipment, appliances and so on typically all use designs custom to their maker. The paradox of the Windows PC market has been that Microsoft’s broadly licensed software supposedly saves hardware makers from investing in software development while ensuring compatibility, when in reality it adds significant costs to PC makers while limiting their ability to differentiate themselves. That explains why PC makers have been perpetually merging together and going out of business while Microosft has rolled in money over the last two decades. Parallel efforts to copy Microsoft in broadly licensing an operating system have regularly failed: IBM’s OS/2, Apple’s Mac OS, Palm’s PDA OS, even Microsoft’s own efforts to duplicate Windows dominance in other markets, from copy machines to PDAs to smartphones to SPOT watches to music players. The closest copy may be Symbian, but its customers are partners, not simply consumers of a generic third party’s operating system as Windows licensees are. That indicates it is not necessary to duplicate the dominance exercised by Microsoft over the PC industry in the smartphone market. Google’s Android and Symbian exist more as technology sharing pacts among manufacturers, but both aspire to take Microsoft’s DOS role among smartphones. However, the idea that Apple’s iPhone must be dethroned by a modern-day DOS, whether Windows Mobile, Android, or Symbian, is not just debatable, but does not sync with the reality of more recent events. Apple’s recent history of the iPod further refutes the idea that a software analog to Microsoft is needed. The iPod Emergence: Apple & Pixo vs IBM & Microsoft. With the iPod, Apple played the role of IBM in 1981, using Pixo’s embedded operating system to enter the market quickly, just as IBM had used DOS. The difference was that Apple didn’t direct any market attention toward Pixo and added a lot of value on top of that core embedded OS. A modern day Compaq couldn’t simply clone the hardware and license Pixo to run on it in order to compete against the iPod, because the iPod was much more than just generic hardware running Pixo software. As the iPod developed, Pixo’s role diminished and was eventually displaced. Just like IBM, Apple jumped into a new market just as demand was beginning to explode. Apple made MP3 players far more attractive to a general audience by delivering greater playback capacity than most entry level devices offered, along with an ease of use that encouraged buyers to jump in at the higher end of the market. That left Apple with not only the lion’s share of the market, but also by far the most profitable segments of the market. Two decades prior, IBM badly fumbled its play with the early PC and ended up irrelevant in the PC world by the late 80s, sideswiped by Microsoft’s DOS and the cloners who were licensing it in parallel, notably Compaq and later HP and Dell. Steve Jobs had witnessed that happen, and was determined to not let it happen again to Apple. Rather than being manipulated by a software middleware vendor as IBM had, Apple worked to incrementally develop the iPod market itself. After consuming the hard drive-based player market, Apple took on the Flash RAM-based market with a tiny hard drive system used in the iPod Mini, and followed up with Flash-based devices of its own in the Nano and Shuffle. This allowed Apple to progressively serve an increasingly wider market, incrementally growing upon an established foundation. With the iPod, Apple became, in effect, an IBM with its own internal Microsoft. Microsoft’s Failure Despite Features. Microsoft blamed the failure of PFS upon its music store and hardware partners and decided to take Apple on itself in 2006. It relaunched a Toshiba PFS player as its own device under the Zune brand, adding WiFi music sharing features and a larger display than the current Pods had. It failed dramatically as well. Did Microsoft’s attempts to float a new DOS among music players fail because of Apple’s success, or due to Microsoft’s own problems? The failure of the Zune, which followed the iPod model rather than the DOS model, seems to suggest that Microsoft itself was to blame. Of course, when the iPhone was released, it hit Windows Mobile hardest. The iPhone made Windows Mobile Smartphones look ridiculous and underpowered, and made Windows Mobile Pocket PC phones look clumsy and awkward, despite the fact that they both supported a variety of features the iPhone didn’t, including the ability to edit documents, capture video, send MMS, and so on. Simply adding on features did not enable Microsoft to compete against Apple. The only conclusion that can be drawn from all this is that competing against Apple requires more than just having a feature arsenal. Microsoft’s failures in themselves do not necessarily mean that Google’s Android will fail in its attempts to float its own smartphone platform. Why Microsoft’s Zune is Still Failing Will Google Succeed where Microsoft Failed? Microsoft’s demonstrated inability to successfully enter consumer markets for MP3 players and smartphones has given observers little faith that the company will somehow turn things around in late 2009 when its next generation of devices are expected to be released. However, prior to that the first fruits of Google’s efforts to build its own smartphone operating environment will arrive. Will Google’s Android take over Microsoft’s crown as the “DOS vendor” among smartphones? Supporters of Google’s Android project point to some parallels between Android for smartphones and Windows on the PC: Android will allow hardware makers to differentiate in ways that can offer features Apple can’t (or doesn’t want to); it should allow software developers to offer features Apple does not allow on the iPhone; it embraces open, hobbyist experimentation in ways that Apple currently isn’t; and it opens the potential for content providers that Apple is not interested in allowing. Openness is Android’s key competitive feature. Will all this openness allow Google to unseat the iPhone to become the primary platform developers want to participate in, and subsequently soak up the market for third party hardware makers that Windows Mobile serves? While Google currently has no market share due to the fact that no Android phones have yet shipped, it does have broad vocal support from a variety of the same kinds of hardware manufacturers that supported DOS and Windows and helped to make those platforms successful in the desktop PC market. HTC and Android. HTC was quick to throw its support behind Android despite its long term alliance with Windows Mobile. Why would it so enthusiastically support an unproven platform from a company that has no experience in consumer hardware platforms? One can only assume that HTC is not happy with the current state of Windows Mobile, and desperately wants another “DOS” to succeed where Microsoft’s has so spectacularly failed. As an Original Design Manufacturer for Palm, HTC watched as Palm adopted Windows Mobile in place of the Palm OS and subsequently fell even deeper into crisis. Palm’s only successful phone since has been its Palm OS-based Centro. HTC undoubtedly sees Android as its ticket to becoming the next Dell, but without a similar dependance upon Microsoft. Android for mobile phones is essentially playing the role of Linux for PCs, except that it has the backing of a major company behind it. Can Android Take on the iPhone with Openness as its Feature? Similarly, in the music business, Linux-based MP3 players have had no impact on the iPod, despite offering more features, flexibility, support for additional codecs, and so on. In the mobile phone area, Linux enjoys a sizable portion of the smartphone market, but this is almost entirely due to phones sold by Motorola in China, where the advantages of Linux’ openness are void. Motorola’s Linux phones offer nothing to users in terms of openness or flexibility, and are really no different in terms of features than other appliance ‘feature phones’ based upon closed operating systems. And again, a key problem with assaulting Apple in a feature war is that neither the iPod nor the iPhone became popular by being “highly featured.” They both delivered perhaps 80% of the functionality found in all other devices in the market. Rather than trying to match every feature and cater to every niche as Microsoft had with Windows Mobile, Apple’s devices did a few things very well at launch, and incrementally developed into full featured devices that still lack some of the more unique features of their competitors. Further, in terms of openness, the demographic that embraces Linux’ characteristic freedoms is not the same as the demographic that buys smartphones in quantity and then pays for data service. This is a critical fact to consider because a big part of the iPhone’s success stems from the fact that it is being pushed by mobile providers who want to capture the cream of the market willing to pay a premium for data services. The Frankenphone. Apple’s advantage comes from slick hardware designs with a close attention to detail, combined with software that purposely does less so that it can do what it does better. Even Apple’s own conservative attempts to broaden its software capabilities with iPhone 2.0 have resulted in instability problems that can be blamed upon both Apple’s early releases of its phone operating system and software from inexperienced third party developers new to the platform. Would the current frustrations with iPhone 2.0 be somehow mitigated by additional openness that also embraced all kinds of variables from different hardware makers with less quality control than Apple, a loose committee of additional cooks working to serve up operating system features targeted at every possible conceived need, and a wider third party software group with fewer constraints on illegal behaviors? The Failure of Open. OpenMoko was supposed to release its first mobile phone to consumers for $250 several months in advance of the iPhone. When the iPhone shipped, the group then announced new plans to get its phone out by the end of 2007. Instead, this spring the group announced new plans to move to an entirely different development platform, and ship its phone mid year for $400 with limited functionality and incomplete software outside of basic GSM phone features. Linux’s notable successes, from Motorola’s Linux phones to the Tivo DVR to Linksys Routers, have often come without any associated openness or freedom, and were instead delivered simply to provide their manufacturer with a free kernel to build upon. This indicates that while Linux may find its way into an increasing number of smartphones, it will likely not be accompanied by the glorious freedom of an open development environment Google has said it would offer with Android. Apple iPhone vs the FIC Neo1973 OpenMoko Linux Smartphone Can Google Succeed Where Open Has Previously Failed? Further, Google has restricted initial development to higher level APIs just as Apple did, further indicating that Google itself realizes that being wildly open to impress a minority of hobbyists will not result in the commercial success of its new platform. That serves to neuter Android’s primary advantage over the iPhone. Without delivering on the premise of being wide open, Android is really just a less mature set of Java libraries used to create a specialized binary that runs on a Linux foundation. Unlike Apple’s iPhone, Android phones won’t have a slick user interface developed by professional artists, nor the iPhone’s legacy of mature software development frameworks crafted over the last thirty years, nor the iPhone’s tightly integrated hardware with award winning industrial design, nor its marketing power tied into the iPod and Apple’s retail stores. Android won’t be an open iPhone, it will only be a Windows Mobile phone with a better kernel that runs specialized Java software instead of Win32 or .NET code. Don’t expect consumers to be impressed by that. The Biggest Missing Feature. In 1981 and 1991, consumers who wanted Apple computers faced the sticker shock of a somewhat arrogant price tag. Apple sold its computers, as it still does, at the higher end of the market, but there was simply far more range in prices available. In 1981, that meant the Apple II was $2600 and the new Apple III was $3500, even before you added a monitor. On the low end, Commodore sold its far less powerful, but “still a computer” Vic-20 for $300, while IBM entered the market with the IBM PC at $3000. Over the next few years, Apple focused on delivering additional sophistication at the same price, releasing the $10,000 Lisa and then the $2,500 Macintosh. IBM continued selling PCs in the same $3,000 to $10,000 range, but other DOS PC vendors began selling machines at prices that ranged as low as $1500. That left Apple with a roughly $1000 price premium over low end PCs. The products weren’t really comparable, but consumers only saw the huge price difference. In 1991, Apple was still selling moderate to high-end Macintoshes for $3,800 to $10,000; the crippled Mac LC was $2500, and obsolete-at-birth Mac Classic ranged from $999 to $1500. Windows allowed PC makers to ship a functional $1500 PC and claim a rough approximation to Apple’s $2500 entry level system, maintaining that apparent $1000 price premium. Today, pundits are lucky to find a Dell or HP system that is even a couple hundred dollars less than a comparable Mac. However, in the smartphone business, the iPhone 3G is now the same price, if not less, than generic competing phones on the market. Even more significant is the fact that the price of the phone hardware is nearly nothing compared to the cost of the service plan. This fact simply eases any price premium that could cause buyers to flock to a smartphone running a generic operating system over buying the iPhone 3G, regardless of whether it runs Windows Mobile or Android. 1990-1995: Planting Software Seeds Android Partners Have Already Failed. Apple now has tremendous market power in buying RAM and other components that will prevent any competitors from being able to offer a huge discount over the iPhone’s $199 price tag. Even if competitors were to give their phones away, they would only offer a $200 discount to users who would then still need to pay the same mobile fees to use the phone. Android’s other partners, including Samsung and LG, have already failed to capture any significant market share in the music player market. Are they going to maintain their position as smartphone makers now that they face similar competition from Apple, its iPod ecosystem, its iTunes Music and Apps Store, Apple’s retail store experience, and other factors that are pushing the iPhone? If they can, it is not obvious how partnering with Android will help. Other Problems for Android. Android just published its first open SDK beta update earlier this week, warning developers that “applications developed with it may not quite be compatible with devices running the final Android 1.0.” Additionally, Android still has no phones available. By the time the HTC Dream is expected to launch, Apple will have an installed base of around ten million iPhone (and iPod touch) users supporting software development through iTunes. The business model for selling Android apps is no better than that for selling jailbreak iPhone apps: there is no iTunes Apps Store to promote them, so users will have to track them down on their own. Android developers also have no real freedom that jailbreak iPhone developers lack. The only difference is that there are ten million iPhones to sell jailbreak apps to, and currently zero Android phones. If selling a jailbreak iPhone app sounds like more trouble than its worth, imagine trying to sell Android apps to a non-existant audience. Now add the official iPhone App Store into the mix, where publicity, promotion and profits are booming. What platform is going to have the most applications? How many users will flock to a smartphone platform with no apps? The wisdom of releasing a desirable phone and achieving a significant installed base before releasing an SDK makes a lot more sense in retrospect. Additionally, while Apple has a decade of experience in shipping regular updates to Mac OS X and its Xcode developer tools, Google has only shipped a random assortment of web-oriented SDKs (a number of which have been abandoned) as a tangent to its core business of selling advertisements. When the Android SDK 1.0 is finished later this year, developers will not only lack an installed base to sell their apps to, but will also have no high profile market for selling their apps in, and subsequently no financial incentive to develop applications that add value to the Android platform, just like Linux on the PC desktop. Around the same time, possibly within the next month, Apple will be shipping its second major OS release: iPhone 2.1. Apple will also be upgrading its entire user base to the new software so that developers will have a cohesive platform to target. This mirrors the efforts Apple has taken to upgrade its Mac OS X users to the same reference release. Mobile developers will be seeing money pouring in via iTunes while crickets chirp in the Android section of various mobile online stores. Apple’s iPhone Vs. Other Mobile Hardware Makers: 5 Revenue Engines Same Same, But Different: DOS Model Problems. Each Android phone will also have unique camera hardware, support for different video and audio codecs, and varied support for other differentiating proprietary services demanded by mobile operators. This will force developers to to make complex decisions regarding the lowest common denominator they choose to support. So while the iPhone will have a cohesive feature set, a managed software environment, and a functional market, Android will be a loose federation of hardware makers selling the same random features found on Windows Mobile today, with a chaotic development environment that lacks any central market for users or developers. And it will be run as an experiment by a company with no experience in consumer hardware or platform development. The Missing Tap. Most existing smartphones, even those trying to directly rival the iPhone, use a stylus driven, pressure sensitive tap screen or a simpler, cheaper touch technology that lacks support for sensing multitouch. The iPhone’s screen can actually sense up to five fingers at once, but the primary feature multitouch offers on the iPhone is the two fingered tapping and the pinching effects everyone associates with it. Android could certainly support multitouch if there were a demand for it, but that’s the point: Google knows that its hardware partners are cheap and unlikely to put out hardware that actually competes with the iPhone. Instead of using expensive technologies that deliver clever yet largely invisible functionality, OHA members, just like PC makers, are far more likely to add flashy, impractical gadgety fluff that’s cheap to tack on, such as slide out keyboards, neon tubes, and scratch and sniff stickers. That’s how you impress gullible nerds on the cheap. Google itself is blowing smoke and erecting mirrors to distract from the reality that it being a “DOS vendor” means supporting bargain basement hardware from penny pinching duplicators. Android has been demonstrating some “wow” features such as a Street Maps app that pans around based on an internal compass in the demonstration phone. The problem is that that kind of thing only makes for a fun demo. Nobody needs to twirl around their phone in the air to see a view of the other side of the street, but everyone who has used an iPhone will wonder why they can’t pinch to zoom out. Even worse, most Android phones aren’t going to have a compass built into them, so Google is demonstrating features most Android users won’t be able to use. That Sounds Like Microsoft… Google’s design decisions are beginning to look a lot like Windows Vista; rather than actually working to make laptops boot faster, Microsoft came up with the idea of adding a small screen to the back of Vista laptops so users could check their email without having to wake the system up. But this was a stupid idea for a number of reasons, the most obvious being that most users just want a laptop that boots up quickly. Few laptops got the mini screen, but every user who tries Vista on their laptop will wonder why it doesn’t boot up as fast as Mac OS X Leopard. In the same way, Google is advertising features for Android that most users won’t ever see in their actual phones while ignoring things people will expect based on their exposure to the iPhone. Android is simply selecting the wrong features. Android will offer the advantages of supporting MMS, recording video, and the list of other features Windows Mobile already supplies. Those features didn’t stop Apple from firing past Microsoft in the smartphone arena however, just as the Zune’s highly touted WiFi and screen didn’t phase iPod buyers. Incidentally, just months after the Zune, Apple had not only demonstrated a larger display but a higher definition multitouch screen, and not only WiFi, but functional WiFi that could be used to browse the web or check email. This suggests that Apple, with its faster release schedule, won’t stay behind any of the leading features potentially offered by Android for very long. Android partners, however, will find it as difficult to catch up with Apple’s unique features, just as Microsoft has been stymied to keep up with Mac OS X, the iPod, and the iPhone. The underlying reason: both Google and Microosft are tasked with maintaining support for a huge variety of hardware options demanded by all their partners. Apple has the unique circumstances to do only what it needs to do itself. Android in Windows Mobile’s Shoes. Windows Mobile was adopted by Windows-bound IT shops despite its weaknesses. Nobody has any preexisting reason to try an Android phone apart from hobbyists and open software enthusiasts, a demographic that has done little to move Linux on the PC desktop. Google also lacks Microsoft’s installed base; it’s starting from zero. The smartphone industry initially doubted Apple’s chances of making much progress with the iPhone, despite the company having the Mac platform, the iPod, retail stores, platform development experience, marketing savvy, industrial design prowess, and so on. Google doesn’t have any of those things. Mobile Providers vs Android. AT&T took a big risk in getting behind the iPhone, as the phone encouraged users to use email rather than fee-based SMS and MMS, it supported WiFi for data access, and it bypassed AT&T’s MEdia Net services to plug into iTunes instead. Verizon refused to parter with Apple and grant it those kinds of concessions. Is AT&T going to take a similar risk to partner with a phone that is not exclusive to it, and is Verizon now going to open its arms to support phones that do not exclusively support BREW, VCast and its other proprietary services? While Android may well eat into Microsoft’s Windows Mobile business by stealing away its hardware makers, it seems unlikely that Android will ever serve as more than free alternative to Windows Mobile in a market where Windows Mobile is increasingly irrelevant. Android may have the dubious distinction of swallowing Microsoft’s mobile business the same way Microsoft ate up the Palm OS, but even if it accomplishes that goal, Google will likely find itself unsustainably hungry immediately afterward. It will also find itself swimming in a shark tank of hungry rivals, including Nokia’s Symbian, RIM’s BlackBerry, and Apple’s iPhone. Symbian is the final generic platform vying for the opportunity to play DOS in the smartphone market. The next article will examine Nokia’s chances in its bid to match Microsoft’s PC dominance in the mobile market while setting out in a new venture to copy Android’s open software model.
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Categories: Apple Commentary
What’s Next from Apple: New iPods Sept 22, iPhone OS 2.1, iTunes 8.0
A month before the iPhone was unveiled, Rose predicted it would be available from CDMA providers, have a pull out keyboard, and sport two batteries, one for music and one for the phone. Of course, splitting a battery in half is not really a brilliant solution to prevent music playback from running down your phone, but the simple fact that Rose didn’t know about the exclusive deal with Cingular (come on, it was Apple’s only mobile partner to date) and the unlikelihood of Apple tacking on an HTC-esque keyboard makes his guesswork easy to dismiss. I had imagineered the iPhone as a web browsing iPod (“based on Nokia’s mobile contributions to Safari”) with SMS messaging features, contacts, calendar, and a camera… six months earlier. And CDMA? I recommended Apple “leave Verizon alone and partner with Cingular, TMobile, and MetroPCS using GSM technology.” The difference between my ideas and those from Rose, apart from mine being six months earlier, is that I presented mine as only reasonable ideas with some rationale behind them; Rose insisted he had special knowledge from reliable sources. Generation 6 iPods The Real iPod touch Deets. Now he’s predicting new iPods. The iPod touch is supposed to get “fairly large price drops to distance itself from the $199 iPhone.” Sorry, wrong. The iPhone is only $199 in the minds of consumers. It gets a subsidy from AT&T, which is why you can’t just buy one for $199 and walk out the door without signing a phone contract. The iPhone’s $2,000 service contract offers plenty of distance between it and the iPod touch. The iPod touch is not possibly going to get cheaper than the iPhone for a couple reasons. First, obviously, it costs nearly as much to make. The lack of a subsidy pretty much balances out its lack of mobile radio components. Second, Apple isn’t desperately trying to sell the iPod touch. It exists as a product to sell to users who can’t or won’t buy an iPhone because they’re tied to Verizon or don’t want a phone. Rose worries that the iPhone is “cannibalizing sales of the iPod,” but there’s nothing more Apple would like to do than to feed every iPod user an iPhone. Sure the bonehead analysts will have another field day complaining about how there’s only minor growth among iPod sales while they ignore iPhone numbers, but these guys aren’t easy to reach with basic facts. Apple has been giving away the $300 iPod touch to students buying a laptop; that looks like an effort to broaden the iPhone platform. Apple wants college kids playing iPhone games and interested in creating their own iPhone software. Left to their own devices, most kids would buy the old hard drive iPod Classic because they think they need to walk around with their entire torrent library of stolen music. (Get off my lawn!) In any case, we all knew the iPod refresh was coming. I’m pretty sure they’re coming on September 22. I’m also pretty sure that the 8GB iPod touch is going away, making the 16GB model the new $199 version. That outrageous price drop, facilitated by today’s cheaper Flash RAM, would kill the remaining market for the hard drive-based iPod Classic, converting Apple’s entire lineup to Flash RAM. Additionally, it would migrate even more iPod buyers into the installed base of iPhone App Store users and hasten the cannibalization food chain that leads toward the iPhone. The 16GB iPod touch will be sold next to the existing 32GB model, which was just released earlier this year. For that reason, I don’t see a larger capacity model being introduced now. I don’t see tremendous demand for carrying 64GB of music from people who are also ready to pay for 64GB of Flash. Nano 4: Zune 2007? Rose says the Nano will get a redesign that makes it look like last year’s Flash RAM Zune; iLounge already predicted this a month ago, although Rose embellished his version with the idea that “the actual plastic on the outside will be curved,” presumably like a TV from the 80s. How nostalgic! I miss having a wildly distorted tube picture, almost as much as a scratchable plastic iPod screen. Oh the good ol’ days. Will Apple expend significant resources to make the Nano 4 into a widescreen tall/long player and define a new 4GB hardware model to fit into a niche that is only $50 less than the new 16GB $199 iPod touch? How much room for differentiation is there under $200? Seems more likely that Apple will instead only release a cheaper version of the existing 4GB Nano that’s closer to $99, leaving room for a $149 8GB Nano in between. That will pull Shuffle buyers up into splurging on a full video Nano. If you want to watch video sideways, you can get an iPod touch for $199. What kind of widescreen cinematic experience can you get with a long/tall Nano/Zune? When I reviewed the Flash Zune, one of the complaints was that half (but only half) of the controls reconfigure when you hold it sideways. Plus, existing iPod Games wouldn’t work in the widescreen orientation; both the display and the controls would be messed up. On top of that, regular video playback would be forced to play back wide, and/or look bad because its stretched. Microsoft has no qualms with playing video in an odd aspect radio, but the iPod is made by Apple, which has some aesthetic boundaries that constrain its behavior. Winter 2007 Buyer’s Guide: Microsoft Zune 8 vs iPod Nano iPhone 2.1 Rose says Apple will also release “iPod touch 2.1 software, iPhone to get update very soon after.” We already all knew the iPhone 2.1 update was coming, and that it’s going to be significant, and that it is due for release around the same time as the new iPods. Whether the new iPod touch will ship with it in advance of the iPhone would depend on whether iPhone-only features in the release hold it up, but Rose doesn’t suggest any special knowledge or rationale behind this claim. iPhone 2.1 is supposed to usher in new GPS features and the push Notification system, but the real demand for downloading it will be that it fixes a major problem that currently causes third party iPhone apps to crash on launch and randomly when running. Apple needs to get this out quick before it blows the reputation of iPhone software stability in the minds of users. That’s reason to believe that iPhone 2.1 might ship even before the new iPods, rather than the other way around. Because software developed using the iPhone 2.1 SDK won’t run on iPhone 2.0.x, expect everyone to need to update their software to download a new generation of 2.1-only apps. This will be free for iPhone users, but might incur a nominal fee for iPod touch users due to accounting rules. Myths of Snow Leopard 3: Mac Sidelined for iPhone iTunes 8.0 Rose says iTunes 8.0 “it’s a big update with new features,” but doesn’t say what they are. He also says it will be “a real point upgrade” deserving the 8.0 name. However, there is little rhyme or reason to Apple’s iTunes version numbering, and no real correlation between the amount features introduced and the version number increment. iTunes 2.0 added iPod support after ten months of iTunes 1.0, but iTunes 3.0 only added minor features the next year. It was replaced by iTunes 4.0 a year later, which added the Music Store and AAC support. Two years later, iTunes 5 introduced some cosmetic changes and was immediately replaced with iTunes 6.0 only a month later, without any major new features. Another year later, iTunes 7.0 arrived with a new look, video game support, and Coverflow. It has since seen loads of new features, from support for Apple TV to the iPhone to new iPods and new movie rentals, all of which were only numbered as minor updates. We’ve had iTunes 7.x for two years now, so iTunes 8.0 is not really ballsy prediction at this point. Of course, Apple is just as likely to skip ahead and release iTunes X. And if iTunes X isn’t ready, we can might even get iTunes 7.8 and 7.9 over the next couple years. Oh my sides. With the likelihood of entirely new iPod touch or Nano models being quite low (after all, the Zune isn’t going to get a refresh until late next year, and Apple isn’t facing any tough competition at the moment), Apple’s iPod announcement might end up more about a new iTunes than the iPod. Rose doesn’t make any iTunes 8.0 feature predictions, instead jumping ahead to suggest that Apple is working to make sure Mac OS X 10.5.6 will provide support for Sony’s BluRay, the competition to iTunes that nobody cares about. Hmm. Steve Jobs has so little regard for optical discs that he basically shunned iDVD last year when showing off iLife 08, but now he’s going to resurrect BluRay and excite customers by including it on the company’s laptops, where any resolution advantage it offers over DVD would be nearly invisible? Oh ho ho my sides. iTunes Unlimited? I’ve written up lots of reasons why subscription music was an awful idea that wouldn’t fly. I doubt Apple will actually float it as rumored (“iTunes Unlimited” for $129 sounds awful). However, enough has changed in the last two years to reconsider how subscription music could be delivered. For starters, the iPhone and iPod touch are now wireless, so they can both stream and verify exploding media DRM. Apple’s iTunes, modern iPods, Apple TV, and the iPhone also now already handle exploding DRM for movie rentals, which blew over last year without any complaint, although it doesn’t look like iTunes’ movie rentals have had a massive impact on the world due to their relatively high price point. Offering movie rentals appeared to be a requisite concession leading up to convincing the movie studios to agree to movie sales in iTunes. Apple could sell access to subscription music directly from the iPhone and iPod touch that worked similar to movie rentals, and the labels might even allow users to freely copy rental tracks between computers linked to the same iTunes account. Such an arrangement hasn’t found mainstream popularity elsewhere, but nobody else had been able to sell music prior to iTunes either. While the rumors suggest there could be a discount for MobileMe users, it would be a lot smarter to make it part of MobileMe instead. That would limit subscribers to Apple’s loyal base, easing in the system rather than exposing a brand new subscription service to ten million handheld users and 150 million iTunes users and all but promising another meltdown. At least by making it part of MobileMe, Apple could add lots of subscribers and upgrade existing subscribers to a $99 “unlimited music” additional fee. Keep in mind that all this is highly speculative. I doubt “unlimited iTunes” will fly, as the idea was not leaked but rather simply invented. How Apple Could Deliver Workable iTunes Rentals As Long As We’re Speculating… Apple also needs to add remote functionality for controlling Apple TV to iTunes, just as you can already do via the free iPhone app. And how about direct streaming of content between iTunes, Apple TV, and the iPhone, such as for movie rentals. Currently, to get a rented movie from an iPhone to Apple TV you have to do two syncs involving a middleman iTunes PC. iTunes also needs to expand on the options for syncing media to the iPod and iPhone. In addition to syncing specific playlists, it should be able to automatically sync over a smart “Party Shuffle” mix of music that fills a specific proportion of the device, such as 50% music, 10% podcasts, and then the specific movies, TV, and audio books the user selects. Then shuffle out the listened to tracks and add new music every time it’s synced. Allow users to hide songs from iTunes just as you can hide photos from your iPhoto album to simplify the view without deleting anything. Add Time Machine support so you can go back to see earlier play counts and browse your media library as it appeared in the past. Add integrated support for viewing PDFs and other QuickView document types, so you could use iTunes as a metadata-rich document browser with search and playlist features. Or give Preview an iTunes metadata document database interface. More Music Deals. I’d also like to see Apple get AT&T to allow users to place calls over their WiFi link as a concession for not having a functional 3G network in place yet. I also think AT&T should sell or rent AirPort base stations to its millions of broadband users, with all of them open to WiFi sharing so that iPhone users could place a freaking call and access the web at faster than EDGE speeds between now and whenever AT&T actually gets 3G rolled out. Apple also really needs to deliver some sort of central media server, possibly tacked onto Apple TV. Just add a USB hard drive and have it serve up the contents as a Bonjour-discoverable iTunes library to your local network. This would allows users to dump all the media off their laptop. And then allow WiFi sync to optionally copy fresh media to the iPhone from the central media server library. There’s plenty that could be tacked onto iTunes, but the biggest new thing in the iPod announcement actually might be something entirely different than last year’s iPods for cheaper and a new rev to iTunes. I’ll spill that in the next article. Ten Big Predictions for Apple in 2008 Like reading RoughlyDrafted? Share articles with your friends, link from your blog, and subscribe to my podcast (oh wait, I have to fix that first). It’s also cool to submit my articles to Digg, Reddit, or Slashdot where more people will see them. Consider making a small donation supporting this site. Thanks!
Categories: Apple Commentary
iPhone 3G sales hampered by Windows MobileSources within Apple’s retail stores report that sales of the iPhone 3G are being slowed down by handhelds running Microsoft Windows Mobile/WinCE. That’s because the stores have been selling new iPhones to customers using the old EasyPay, a problematic Pocket PC handheld computer that’s causing employees lots of grief.
Categories: Apple Commentary
Is Apple’s MobileMe Secure?
Inside MobileMe: Web 3 and Web Client-Server apps For the record: Apple’s MobileMe desktop email can be secured via encrypted SMTP and IMAP; Apple presents details on how to ensure this is set up, as users may not have this enabled by default. Address Book and iCal sync on Mac OS X is secured automatically when it transacts with Apple’s server cloud. Windows apps use the same security when syncing their data via Outlook through iTunes for Windows. The iPhone and iPod touch also support encrypted email and all push messages are also secured via encryption. However, the MobileMe web apps are only secured by SSL through the initial login authentication session and again only when users access their account information to do things such as change their password, update their billing information, or order additional services. Outside of that, all email, calendar, and contact data that is exchanged between the web client and the cloud is not encrypted, and can be sniffed by anyone with access to the network (below, click to enlarge). What Unencrypted Web Apps Mean for Users. MobileMe’s limited SSL protection on its web apps presents a real (albeit unlikely to be widely exploited) security hole. However, it is important to note that Microsoft and Yahoo provide the same, limited level of SSL protection for their web services as Apple does; both Yahoo Mail and Microsoft’s Live Hotmail send data in the clear after the initial login. Google has just started offering SSL protection by default for Gmail (below, click to enlarge). A followup article recommended that Apple should use the same IPSec-type of security for its MobileMe web services as it does for desktop sync. Other critics have noted that because Apple charges $8.25 per month for MobileMe, it should provide a better level of security than Microsoft or Yahoo and at least match Google. At the same time, it is important to recognize that adding SSL encryption does not automatically or even fully secure email. Apple’s secret “Back to My Mac” push behind IPv6 SSL is Not a Panacea. For example, a user trying to access webmail at me.com could hypothetically be redirected to a fake me.com by a bad DNS server, Alfke wrote. With SSL in place through the entire transaction, the user should at least be warned that the impostor me.com site did not match its known certificate. Without SSL, MobileMe web apps could therefore theoretically fall prey to a man in the middle attack, where all transactions were passed through a malicious user’s third party control for tampering or viewing. Additionally, Alfke theorized that the web apps themselves could be replaced entirely by a fake site that pretended to be MobileMe in an Invasion of the Body Snatchers scenario. There are two problems with these scenarios. Alfke’s assumption that MobileMe’s “unauthenticated JSON exchange” could be easy to exploit, allowing redirect via bad DNS, is based in conjecture not fact. In response to his posting, Andrew Jaquith of the Yankee Group pointed out “there are lots of ways for two parties keep rotating secrets on both sides of the wire without disclosing them. See, for example, RFC 1938. I don’t know exactly what Apple is doing with JSON, but dismissing it just because it isn’t encrypted doesn’t prove anything.” Jaquith also described why SSL is not good for “verifying that software is ‘genuine’ or that a website is what you expect,” as Alfke claimed in dismissing Apple’s security architecture for its MobileMe web services. Jaquith presented a scenario that would result in “a supposedly sniff-resistant [SSL] session that is still nonetheless 100% hosed.” Re: MobileMe Webmail Security — There Is None — Thought Palace Security through False Assurity. On top of that, even in cases where SSL could identify that something bad was happening, the only protection SSL really provides is to throw up a warning about security certificates that most non-technical users browsing at Starbucks would likely just click through to dismiss before happily giving away their credit card info, thinking they are safe because they are interacting with the “SSL” icon on for a website. When Apple transitioned from .Mac to MobileMe, users were presented with a SSL warning related to mac.com being redirected to me.com, and nobody seemed to even notice. SSL warnings are similarly not going to secure users who do not understand the security issues involved when they are sent to me.info or me.192168.com, or redirected by a malicious DNS to a server pretending to be me.com but failing the SSL check. Therefore, the benefits of adding SSL were greatly overstated by some critics, who also failed to even consider its drawbacks and limitations. If Apple simply added SSL, it certainly would, as stated in the original article, provide a “false sense of security that distracts from real security threats.” At the same time, the original article also understated the value SSL would provide web browser users. Adding SSL security throughout MobileMe’s web apps, particularly those that deal with private data, would likely provide benefits that overshadow the added overhead. Despite that, it would not “secure” email for users, as described below. Never Cry Poppycock. Rich Mogull’s “MobileMe Web Interface Insecure, But Other Apps Get It Right,” published by Tidbits, provided some interesting comments on the subject, but began with an unnecessarily arrogantly overstatement of criticism that misstated the point and the context of the article in order to attack it as “patently false” “technobabble” “poppycock” and so on. Mogull didn’t contact the author of the original article prior to writing about what he claimed was so wildly inaccurate. In addition, his own presentation is flawed and overstated in ways that are far more misinforming than any disputed details in the original article. TidBITS Safe Computing: MobileMe Web Interface Insecure, But Other Apps Get It Right Consider the Context. Mogull jumped upon a quote taken out of context, which was actually talking about how MobileMe and other JavaScript apps manage security related to JSON transactions. The context of the quote was the potential threat posed by sending self-executable JSON as opposed to simple XML data: “Being able to inject executable code into a system from malicious sources is a primary security problem. For that reason, web apps that transmit data using JSON have to authenticate with the server and regularly perform security handshakes to ensure that the data being sent back and forth is indeed coming from and going to a trusted source.” Mogull not only ignored that context, but only linked to the second page of the article, where the quote appeared without its immediate context. This enabled him to present that the comments on how JSON is secured were entirely about “why SSL was unnecessary,” which was not the point of the text at all. Quibble vs Patently False. The article presented that there was “unnecessary panic among web users who have equated their browser’s SSL lock icon with web security;” that is accurate. While SSL encryption provides an additional layer of security, is not infallible. SSL security requires faith in fallible architectures that have regularly published vulnerabilities. Suggesting that SSL would be a panacea for webmail is false for a number of reasons: SSL can be spoofed; the browser only presents a cryptic warning when that happens, which many users would not know how to handle if it were being spoofed; and the larger fact that even SSL-secured web email is not really secure. The original article also correctly pointed out that SSL could provide a “false sense of security that distracts from real security threats.” Users who think that SSL web-based email is secure and therefore appropriate for sending confidential information are in for a rude awakening. Email is not secure, and carefully securing part of the email transmission is like only locking three doors of your car. It’s better to understand that thieves can take anything in your car rather than to lock three doors and assume that you can leave valuables on your seat that cannot be taken. Mogull is arguing that Apple hasn’t provided a functional lock on the driver side door of its webmail service, ignoring the fact that Internet email has no locks on the tailgate or the rear doors at all. This is penny wise and pound foolish security, and can be judged as the “patently false technobabble poppycock” that he quickly used to dismiss an article that was only touching on one aspect of security in a larger piece that was really addressing how MobileMe works as a service and the future potential it holds out. Mogull’s reply was entirely about security, but it delivers the wrong message. It’s not just easy to quibble about some of Mogull’s details; his primary argument that the original piece was ridiculously wrong is just false, primarily because he overstates it in such an over the top, arrogant way. SSL is Not Evil. Having said that, the original article did understate the value SSL can add in securing webmail. SSL is useful in protecting users at the point where they will be most vulnerable when checking webmail, as they are more likely to be at a public terminal or perhaps using unsecured public WiFi when using the web rather than desktop clients (which are secure using encrypted transmissions) or an iPhone (similarly secured). SSL web apps would provide MobileMe users a similar level of security; Apple currently does not present this throughout the entire webmail session, only when the user authenticates and if they enter account details to change their password or order new services, as noted previously. With SSL, webmail addressed to other MobileMe users, as well as access to one’s own contacts and calendar would be very secure. Email to other domains would continue to be exposed, unencrypted, as it crosses the open Internet. Sending email is like sending a postcard: anyone intercepting the postcard on its way to the post box, from there through the mail system, or on the way to the recipients mailbox will be able to read what’s written on it. Encrypted email is more like a letter written in code inside of a security envelope: it would be far more difficult to view its contents. However, SSL email only provides security for part of the trip; it’s like carefully guarding your postcard until you drop it in the mailbox. This will prevent casual eavesdroppers from seeing what you’ve written, but won’t protect you from having your postcard read from that point on, because it is wide open throughout the rest of the trip. In addition, when using a public computer or improperly secured WiFi network, the SSL security provided to a webmail user can’t be trusted. A public PC is just as likely to have a spyware keylogger installed (if not more so) than a malicious hacker listening in on the transmission remotely. Your emails could therefore be spied upon before they were sent through the secure SSL pipe to the cloud. Similarly, using an unsecured WiFi connection opens a user to security issues that far outweigh having your email transactions possibly sniffed. Additionally, across the industry there are few webmail providers who deliver greater security that Apple’s MobileMe. Google just recently added SSL, while Microsoft and Yahoo provide similar security to Apple’s web interface in MobileMe: SSL encrypted authentication and account protection (you can’t change your password in the clear on MobileMe, only in an SSL session). Doth Protest Too Much, Methinks. Mogull presented this in a mocking, simplified paraphrase as, “we think SSL would bog down performance without providing security.” He then concedes that he has overstated his own arguement by agreeing that SSL would have a limited impact on securing users, saying, “While there’s a reasonable, if small, risk someone might sniff your connection when you are out in public, the odds of a redirection attack are extremely low.” Mogull could have presented his last paragraph by itself, essentially warning users that MobileMe’s web interface exposes them to unlikely but theoretically possible dangers, and explain that Apple’s expanded use of SSL could help secure its webmail service from some of these kinds of attacks. Instead, the solution he demands would only provide limited benefits to users while providing that suggestion that webmail is more secure that it really is in practice. This is far worse of a problem than acknowledging that email is simply not secure and should not be treated as such.
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Categories: Apple Commentary
Will Windows Mobile Play DOS to Apple’s iPhone?
This decision isn’t going to be made by a class of intellectual elite, or by government mandate. it’s going to be made by the market itself. Here are the factors that will influence the outcome, either marginalizing Apple’s iPhone into a niche as the company has twice experienced previously at the hands of DOS in 1981 and Windows in 1991, or positioning it as the dominant leader as Apple has achieved for itself with the iPod since 2001. Will the iPhone Meet its Match from a Modern Day DOS? It’s easy to try to predict the future with the help of hindsight. However, while we know history keeps repeating, events always do so in slightly different ways that keep us surprised, as anyone who has tried to salvage fashion and wear it again a generation later has found. In this case, we have two historical events serving as potential foreshadowing events. Which will win out: a DOS model or the iPod model? Windows Enthusiasts had been confidently praying for Microsoft’s Windows Media platform to save them from the iPod ever since Apple released its music player. When the PlaysForSure world came crashing down, they rushed to support Microsoft’s own solo attempt to compete against the iPod with Zune. Things really got ugly when the iPhone arrived. Meditative prayers for deliverance from the iPod turned into incessant voodoo chanting against the iPhone, accompanied by spirited dancing around the truth and needling attacks. Philip Solis of ABI Research shifted his attention from conducting interviews that suggested a mass Zune migration to issuing reports denying that the iPhone was a smartphone at all by his own definition. Rob Enderle jumped from hopeful optimism for the Zune (“Microsoft is trying to encompass Apple and turn them into a bit player. The strategy is brilliant, but the question is can they execute?”) to angry condemnation of the iPhone, calling it “damned” and “not a good phone” months before he had ever even touched one. Enderle is now serving as a consultant to Dell’s plans to resurrect its failed “DJ Ditty,” and offering up opinions on how to compete with the iPod, despite having no experience in guiding companies into competition apart from a long career of cheerleading Microsoft’s monopoly position, which was devoid of any functional competitors. Mike Elgan initially wrote that the Zune “scares Apple to the core,” and was confident that Microsoft would “leverage the collective power of Windows XP, Windows Vista, Soapbox (Microsoft’s new ”YouTube killer“) and the Xbox 360” to kill Apple’s iPod business. After the Zune failed and the iPhone took off, Elgan complained that Apple was “arrogant” and “the new Microsoft” and needed to be stopped. Since then, Microsoft has canceled XP, Vista has floundered, Soapbox went nowhere, an the Xbox 360 has done nothing to advance Zune sales. Paul Thurrott similarly called iTunes a dangerous monopoly despite the wide open market for iPod alternatives, and warned “Apple should be stopped before the abuses get too great and harm too many consumers.” However, Thurrott himself has chosen to bravely negotiate those dangers and use iTunes, iPods, the iPhone, and pays for MobileMe. He celebrates his use of Apple products in front of Mac users, and then bad mouths them in his Windows-oriented blogs. Lately he has been increasingly unable to find anything good to say about the Zune or Windows Mobile either, however. More Absurd iPhone Myths: Third Party Software Panic Windows Mobile is Not the DOS You’re Looking For. Even the most devoted, hardcore fans of the Zune and Windows Mobile are having a hard time praising their current incarnations. The next version of each, both of which promise to address their huge gap in functionality compared to the iPhone and iPod touch, is scheduled for late 2009 or 2010. That is an eternity away, particularly considering that the iPhone went from rumor to 2.0 over the same period of time. A year and a half from now, the iPhone will be splitting atoms and curing cancer (so to speak). While Apple has received some appropriate criticism for releasing iPhone 2.0 with considerably less stability and polish than the original iPhone 1.x software, updates improving the situation have been released regularly, with two just in the last month. Windows Mobile users are lucky if they get a minor bug fix once a year, and many users have to wait months after an update is released before their hardware manufacture or mobile provider approves the update for download. The original iPhone also had some teething problems that were quickly addressed in a series of regular updates over its first six months on the market. In comparison, Windows Mobile has been out for over half a decade. It has not only rarely received updates, but has never performed admirably. It is known for poor battery life, rampant instability, and a poor development architecture that is well behind the iPhone’s Cocoa Touch frameworks. Over the last two years, Apple delivered eleven updates to the iPhone OS compared to two from Microsoft, despite the fact that Apple only sold the iPhone over three fourths of that period. Over the next two years, Apple will likely ship another dozen updates while Microsoft only plans to ship one: Windows Mobile 7
Microsoft is troubled with having to support a wide range of Windows Mobile phones that all support different features. PDA-style “Pocket PC” Windows Mobile devices use a larger stylus tap screen, while “Windows Mobile Smartphones” such as the Motorola Q, only provide a tiny screen with no touchscreen capacity. Also, only a few Windows Mobile phones have an accelerometer, or WiFi, or GPS, and the camera in each is unique. These hardware differences complicate developers’ ability to release software that takes advantage of the features of each phone appropriately. Should a game provide accelerometer controls that only work on a few Windows Mobile phones? Should a document viewer application attempt to take advantage of a larger, interactive tap screen or try to cram into a tiny screen driven only by hardware buttons? The iPhone has one screen interface and a single set of hardware features for developers to target. While new iPhone models will eventually broaden those features, Apple will be managing the transition, and has the power to deliver software that abstracts different abilities seamlessly, just as it has on the Mac. For example, location services on the iPhone 3G works identically to those on the original iPhone apart from lacking GPS, and the iPod touch works the same way despite only being able to use WiFi to find its location. Developers don’t have write to a specific profile, they simply ask the device for a location and the software uses the hardware available. Supporting devices from different manufactures all trying to differentiate themselves is simply far more difficult. Wait, Stop, Come Back. In reality, while Microsoft talks up its plans to take over the smartphone market, Windows Mobile has been dramatically losing market share among smartphones despite having taken over the software reigns at Palm and snuffing out the Palm OS to take its position as heir to the Treo dynasty. The Windows desktop monopoly has done nothing to shore up Windows Mobile’s declining market share, which according to Canalys has slipped from 23% in 2004 to around 12% today. Instead, Apple rose to match and then exceed Microsoft’s market share among smartphones in the US within just three months of sales. It not only maintained its lead in the US, but with the release of the iPhone 3G appears to have caught up to Microsoft’s entire worldwide shipments across all of its providers in its first weeks on going on sale.
Apple also had a severe price premium to overcome when selling against DOS PCs (most of which were sold with a fraction of the RAM or graphics capabilities of the Mac), and Apple itself was doing a poor job of marketing the Mac, with CEO John Sculley choosing to promote “Apple II forever” while Jean-Luis Gassée pulled plans to push Macs in business and targeted the high end desktop publishing niche instead. When Microsoft began successfully promoting Windows in 1991, it was selling to that same DOS PC audience, which had only become further entrenched over the last eight years. The Mac was already hammered into a tight niche and Apple had done little to advance its technological lead over the PC. On top of all that, Apple had handed Microsoft a wide open license to use its Mac interface conventions, and then embroiled itself in unsuccessful litigation to undo the damage. By the time Windows began shipping broadly, Sculley was focused on his political career while Gassée was getting ready to start his own company. Mac Office, $150 Million, and the Story Nobody Covered The iPhone has broad appeal leveraging Apple’s iPod, Mac, and retail store successes. Apple is actually marketing its products effectively now through its own retail stores. AT&T and other mobile partners are also working to sell the iPhone because it generates more money for them; ten years ago, Apple could barely get retailers to stock its products, let alone market them. Not only are Apple’s sales outpacing those of Windows Mobile devices, but users are now browsing the web four times more frequently from the iPhone than from Windows Mobile. Apple not only has a huge mindshare and technical lead, but has a co-development platform spanning the Mac desktop and the iPod touch handheld that shares technology with the iPhone. While Microsoft sells some Pocket PC PDAs lacking mobile service that are not counted in its smartphone market share, Apple sells a vast number of iPod touch devices that likely outnumber sales of the iPhone by a wide margin, and those are similarly not counted in Apple’s smartphone market share. Considering the entire WinCE platform, which includes Windows Mobile Smartphones, Pocket PC (mobile and non-mobile), Zune, and other PlaysForSure licensed Portable Media Center devices, Microsoft’s influence over handheld devices is insignificant compared to Apple’s with the iPod and iPhone, despite the fact that the iPhone and the iPod touch are barely a year old. In the US, where Apple sold the majority of its iPhones in 2007, it outflanked all Windows Mobile sales in its first quarter of sales. A Better DOS than MS-DOS. Like reading RoughlyDrafted? Share articles with your friends, link from your blog, and subscribe to my podcast (oh wait, I have to fix that first). It’s also cool to submit my articles to Digg, Reddit, or Slashdot where more people will see them. Consider making a small donation supporting this site. Thanks!
Categories: Apple Commentary
Apple’s secret “Back to My Mac” push behind IPv6The Internet is running out of addresses. To get around this problem and a host of others not addressed in the existing Internet Protocol (IPv4), a new revision has been in development for years, called IPv6. Uptake has been slow; it requires upgrading all the routers and devices that make up the Internet. Apple has a few tricks up its sleeve for pushing IPv6 adoption, and many Mac users are already chin deep in the technology without even knowing it. Here’s why, and what it means for users on every platform.
Categories: Apple Commentary
Apple gives another 60-day free extension for MobileMe
Continues: Apple gives another 60-day free extension for MobileMe
Categories: Apple Commentary
Apple Enterprise sending thousands of Macs into hotels, cruise ships
Continues: Apple Enterprise sending thousands of Macs into hotels, cruise ships
Categories: Apple Commentary
Inside the iPhone 3G dropped call complaintsExperts and analysts of all stripes are trying to explain what’s wrong with the iPhone 3G, but their answers are frequently supported by bad science, outlandish claims, and pure speculation. Here’s what’s wrong in the reports, and why a simple firmware update is likely to solve the current issues. Continues: Inside the iPhone 3G dropped call complaints
Categories: Apple Commentary
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